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Mr. Geoffrey J . Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Re: Lewis Duncan, et a L , v s . Union 
Pacific Railroad and the State of Utah 
(Department of Transportat ion), et al. 
Case No. 900233 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
defendant/respondent Utah Department of Transportation directs the Court !s 
attention to a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court entitled 
United States v . Gaubert, Case No. 89-1793, decided March 26, 1991, and reported 
at 59 United States Law Week, p . 4244, copy attached. The case holds that 
certain activities of the United States Government are immune from suit pursuant 
to the "discretionary function" exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U .S .C . § 2680, and involves, in our opinion, a helpful discussion relating 
to those types of activities and decisions which are discretionary in nature , 
and for which the governmental entity is immune. We direct the Court's attention 
particularly to the discussion of the discretionary function exception found at 
p p . 4246-4247 of the at tached. This new opinion of the United States Supreme 
Court relates to Point II of the defendant's brief, particularly as it bears on 
the issue of the previously stated inclination of the Utah Supreme Court to "follow 
the lead of cases interpret ing the Federal Tort Claims Act . . . ", Frank v . State, 
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), cited at p . 17 of defendant's brief. 
We are also advised that the 1991 Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 218 
entitled "An Act Relating to Governmental Immunity; Clarifying the Scope and 
Coverage of Governmental Immunity; and Making Technical Corrections." Senate 
Bill 218 made a number of changes in the Governmental Immunity Act, most notably 
in § 63-30-8, which waives immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or 
dangerous conditions of highways, bridges or other s t ruc tures . Both at oral 
argument and in Point II of our brief (pp . 17-22), we argued that Section 8, 
which waives immunity for the "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
April 8, 1991 
Page 2 
highway ff, of necessity had to be modified by the discretionary function 
exception to the waiver of liability found in § 63-30-10, and that if it were 
otherwise, there would be the potential for almost strict liability on the par t of 
governmental entities for accidents occurring on a public road. Senate Bill 218 
amended § 63-30-8 by making its waiver of immunity specifically subject to the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in § 63-30-10. While § 11 of Senate Bill 218 provides 
that it has prospective effect only, nevertheless the amendments clearly set forth 
what the 1991 Legislature believes to be the proper relationship between §§ 8 and 
10 of the Governmental Immunity Act; we submit, however, that the 1991 amend-
ment is consistent with and supportive of the legislative intent of previous 
legislatures and earlier Utah appellate decisions, including Velasquez v . Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. , 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970); Gleave v . Denver and Rio Grande 
Western R .R . , 749 P.2d 660 (Ut. App. 1988); Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores v . 
Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); and Bigelow v . Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1980), and related discussion at p p . 7-16 of respondents brief. A copy of 
the amendments to Sections 63-30-8, 9 and 10 are attached. 
I t rus t you will advise if counsel can be of any further assistance in 
ensuring that the Court is fully advised before finally deciding this most important 
case. 
Very truly yours,( 
ALLAN LULARSOIN 
ALL: mc 
Enclosures: U .S . v. Gaubert 
Governmental Immunity Act Amendments 
cc: Michael A. Katz, Esq. 
J . Clare Williams, Esq. 
(with enclosures) 
Mr. Lee Barr 
James R. Soper, Esq. 
(without enclosures) 
26\ALL\10270.442\Butler.ltr 
the crime than the first was admitted in evidence and found 
to be free of any constitutional objection. Accordingly, I 
would affirm the holding of the Supreme Court of Arizona in 
its initial opinion, and reverse the judgment which it ulti-
mately rendered in this case. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. 
For the reasons stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I agree 
that Fulminante's confession to Anthony Sarivola was not co-
erced. In my view, the trial court did not err in admitting 
this testimony. A majority of the Court, however, finds the 
confession coerced and proceeds to consider whether harm-
less-error analysis may be used when a coerced confession 
has been admitted at trial. With the case in this posture, it 
is appropriate for me to address the harmless-error issue. 
Again for the reasons stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I 
agree that harmless-error analysis should apply in the case of 
a coerced confession. That said, the court conducting a 
harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact a 
full confession may have on the trier of fact, as distinguished, 
for instance, from the impact of an isolated statement that 
incriminates the defendant only when connected with other 
evidence. If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted 
the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on 
that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the 
other evidence in the case. Apart, perhaps, from a video-
tape of the crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence 
more damaging to a criminal defendant's plea of innocence. 
For the reasons given by JUSTICE WHITE in Part IV of his 
opinion, I cannot with confidence find admission of Fulmin-
ante's confession to Anthony Sarivola to be harmless error. 
The same majority of the Court does not agree on the three 
issues presented by the trial court's determination to admit 
Fulminante's first confession: whether the confession was in-
admissible because coerced; whether harmless error analysis 
is appropriate; and if so whether any error was harmless 
here. My own view that the confession was not coerced does 
not command a majority. 
In the interests of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona 
Supreme Court in this capital case, I deem it proper to accept 
in the case now before us the holding of five Justices that the 
confession was coerced and inadmissible. I agree with a ma-
jority of the Court that admission of the confession could not 
be harmless error when viewed in light of all the other evi-
dence; and so I concur in the judgment to affirm the ruling of 
the Arizona Supreme Court. 
BARBARA M. JARRETT, Arizona Senior Assistant Attorney Gener-
al (ROBERT K. CORBIN, Ariz. Atty. Gen., and JESSICA GIF-
FORD FUNKHOUSER, on the briefs) for petitioner; PAUL J. 
LARKIN JR., Assistant to Solicitor General (KENNETH W. 
STARR. Sol Gen.. EDWARD S.G. DENNIS JR., Asst Atty. Gen., 
WILLIAM C. BRYSON, Dpty. Sol Gen., JOEL M 
GERSHQWITZ. Justice Dept. atty., on the briefs) for U.S. as amicus 
curiae; STEPHEN R. COLLINS, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent. 
No. 89-1793 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. THOMAS M. 
GAUBERT 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No. 89-1793. Argued November 26, 1990-Decided March 26. 1991 
When the events in this case occurred, the Home Owners' Loan Act au-
thorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to proscribe 
rules and regulations providing **for the organization, incorporation, 
examination, and regulation" of federal savings and loan associations, 
and to issue charters, "giving primary consideration to the best practices 
of thrift institutions in the United States." 12 U. S. C. 11464(a). Pur-
suant to the Act, the FHLBB and the Federal Home Loan Bank-Dallas 
(FHLB-D) undertook to advise about and oversee certain aspects of 
the operation of Independent American Savings Association (IASA), but 
instituted no formal action against the institution. At their request, 
respondent Gaubert, chairman of the board and IASA's largest stock-
holder, removed himself from IASA's management and posted security 
for his personal guarantee that IASA's net worth would exceed regula-
tory minimums. When the regulators threatened to close IASA unless 
its management and directors resigned, new management and directors 
were recommended by FHLB-D. Thereafter, FHLB-D became more 
involved in IASA's day-to-day business, recommending the hiring of 
a certain consultant to advise it on operational and financial matters; 
advising it concerning whether, when, and how its subsidiaries should be 
placed into bankruptcy; mediating salary disputes; reviewing the draft 
of a complaint to be used in litigation; urging it to convert from state to 
federal charter, and intervening when the state savings and loan depart-
ment attempted to install a supervisory agent at IASA. The new direc-
tors soon announced that IASA had a substantial negative net worth, 
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as-
sumed receivership of the institution. After his administrative tort 
claim was denied, Gaubert filed an action in the District Court against 
the United States under the Federal Ton Claims Act (FTCA), seek-
ing damages for the lost value of his shares and for the property for-
feited under his personal guarantee on the ground that the FHLBB and 
FHLB-D had been negligent in carrying out their supervisory activities. 
The court granted the Government's motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the regulators' actions fell within the discretionary function excep-
tion to the FTCA, 2S U. S. C. § 2680(a). The Court of Appeals reversed 
in part. Relying on Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61. 
the court found that the claims concerning the regulators' activities after 
they assumed a supervisory role in IASA's day-to-day affairs were not 
"policy decisions," which fall within the exception, but were "operational 
actions," which do not. 
Held: 
1. The discretionary function exception covers acts involving an ele-
ment of judgment or choice if they are based on considerations of public 
policy. It is the nature of the conduct rather than the status of the actor 
that governs whether the exception applies. In addition to protecting 
policymaking or planning functions and the promulgation of regulations 
to carry- out programs, the exception also protects Government agents' 
actions involving the necessary element of choice and grounded in the 
social, economic, or political goals of a statute and regulations. If an 
employee obeys the direction of a mandatory regulation, the Govern-
ment will be protected because the action will be deemed in furtherance 
of the policies which led to the regulation's promulgation; and if an 
employee violates a mandator}' regulation, there will be no shelter from 
liability because there is no room for choice and the action will be con-
trary to policy. On the other hand, when established governmental pol-
icy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, 
allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, there is a strong pre-
sumption that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising 
that discretion. 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the discretionary func-
tion exception does not reach decisions made at the operational or man-
agement level of IASA. There is nothing in the description of a discre-
tionary act that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions. 
Day-to-day management of banking affairs regularly requires judgment 
as to which of a range of permissive courses is the wisest. Neither 
Dalehite v. Vvited States, 346 U. S. 15, Indian Towing, supra, nor Ber-
kovitz v. United States, 468 U. S. 531, supports Gaubert's and the Court 
of Appeals' position that there is a dichotomy between discretionary 
functions and operational activities. 
3. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that some of the acts alleged 
in Gaubert's Amended Complaint were not discretionary acts within the 
meaning of § 26S0^ a). The challenged actions did not go beyond "normal 
regulatory activity." They were discretionary, since there were no for-
mal regulations governing the conduct in question, and since the rele-
vant statutory provisions left to the agency's judgment when to institute 
proceedings against a financial institution and which mechanism to use. 
Although the statutes provided only for formal proceedings, they did 
not prevent regulators from supervising I ASA b> informal means, a 
view held by the FHLBB, FHLBB Resolution No 82-381 Gaubert's 
argument that the actions fall outside the exception because they in-
volved the mere application of technical skills and business expertise 
was rejected when the rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision was 
disapproved The FHLBB's Resolution, coupled with the relevant stat-
utory provisions, established governmental policy which is presumed to 
ha\e been furthered when the regulators undertook day-to-da} opera-
tional decisions Each of the regulators' actions was based on pubbc 
policy considerations related either to the protection of the FSLIC's 
insurance fund or to federal oversight of the thrift industry Although 
the regulators used the power of persuasion to accomplish their goals 
neither the pervasiveness of their presence nor the forcefulness of their 
recommendations is sufficient to alter their actions' supervisory nature 
8S5 F 2d 1284, reversed and remanded 
WHITE. J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, 
C J , and MARSHALL BLACKMUN. STEVENS O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and 
Sot'TER, JJ , joined SCALIA, J , filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court 
When the events in this case occurred, the Home Owners' 
Loan Act, 12 U. S C §§ 1461-1470,' provided for the char-
tering and regulation of federal savings and loan associations 
(FSLA's). Section 1464(a) authorized the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) "under such rules and regula-
tions as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, in-
corporation, examination, operation, and regulation" of 
FSLA's, and to issue charters, "giving primary consideration 
to the best practices of thrift institutions in the United 
States "* In this case the FHLBB and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank-Dallas (FHLB-D)8 undertook to advise about and 
oversee certain aspects of the operation of a thrift institution 
Their conduct in this respect was challenged b) a suit against 
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U S C §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq (FTCA),4 asserting that the 
FHLBB and FHLB-D had been negligent in earning out 
their supervisory activities The question before us is 
whether certain actions taken by the FHLBB and FHLB-D 
are within the "discretionary function" exception to the liabil-
ity of the United States under the FTCA The Court of Ap-
1
 Subsequent to the events at issue here and in response to the current 
crisis in the thrift industn, Congress enacted comprehensive changes to 
the statutory scheme concerning thrift regulation b> means of the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recover}, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA), Pub L 101-73, 103 Stat 183 FIRREA abolished the 
FHLBB and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC), two of the agencies at issue here, and repealed the statuton pro-
visions governing those agencies' conduct §§ 401, 407, 103 Stat 354-357, 
363 At the same tune, it granted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) and the newlj established Office of Thrift Supervision dis-
cretional-} enforcement authority similar to that enjojed by the former 
agencies §§201 301, 103 Stat 187-188 277-343 
1
 Section 1464(a^  stated in full 
"In order to provide thrift institutions for the deposit or investment of 
funds and for the extension of credit for homes and other goods and serv-
ices, the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it ma} 
prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, op-
eration, and regulation of associations to be known as Federal savings and 
loan associations, or Federal savings banks, and to issue charters therefor 
giving priman consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions in 
the United States The lending and investment authorities are conferred 
b\ this section to provide such institutions the fle\ibiht> necessan to 
maintain their role of providing credit for housing " 
•FHLB-D was one of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB's) estab-
bshed by the FHLBB pursuant to 12 U S C § 1423 The FHLBB was 
specifically empowered to authorize the performance by FHLB personnel 
of "am function" of the FHLBB except for adjudications and the promul-
gation of rules and regulations 12 U S C § 1437u) 
* The FTCA, subject to various exceptions waves sovereign lmmunit} 
from suits for negligent or wrongful acts of Government emplo>ees 
peals for the Fifth Circuit answered this question in the nega-
tive. We have the contrary view and reverse 
I 
This FTCA suit arises from the supervision by federal 
regulators of the activities of Independent American Savings 
Association (IASA), a Texas-chartered and federally insured 
savings and loan. Respondent Thomas A. Gaubert was 
IASA's chairman of the board and largest shareholder. In 
1984, officials at the FHLBB sought to have IASA merge 
with Investex Savings, a failing Texas thrift. Because the 
FHLBB and FHLB-D were concerned about Gaubert's other 
financial dealings, they requested that he sign a "neutraliza-
tion agreement" which effectively removed him from IASA's 
management. They also asked him to post a $25 million in-
terest in real property as security for his personal guarantee 
that IASA's net worth would exceed regulatory minimums 
Gaubert agreed to both conditions Federal officials then 
provided regulator}' and financial advice to enable IASA to 
consummate the merger with Investex Throughout this pe-
riod, the regulators instituted no formal action against IASA 
Instead, they relied on the likelihood that IASA and Gaubert 
would follow their suggestions and advice 
In the spring of 1986, the regulators threatened to close 
IASA unless its management and board of directors were re-
placed, all of the directors agreed to resign The new of-
ficers and directors, including the chief executive officer 
who was a former FHLB-D employee, were recommended by 
FHLB-D After the new management took over, FHLB-D 
officials became more involved in IASA's day-to-day busi-
ness They recommended the hiring of a certain consultant 
to advise IASA on operational and financial matters, they ad-
vised IASA concerning whether, when, and how its subsid-
iaries should be placed into bankruptcy, they mediated salary 
disputes, the> reviewed the draft of a complaint to be used in 
litigation, they urged IASA to convert from state to federal 
charter, and they actively intervened when the Texas Sav-
ings and Loan Department attempted to install a supervisor) 
agent at IASA In each instance, FHLB-D's advice was 
followed 
Although IASA was thought to be financially sound w hile 
Gaubert managed the thrift, the new directors soon an-
nounced that IASA had a substantial negative net worth 
On May 20, 1987, Gaubert filed an administrative tort claim 
with the FHLBB, FHLB-D, and FSLIC. seeking $75 million 
in damages for the lost value of his shares and $25 million for 
the property he had forfeited under his personal guarantee h 
That same day, the FSLIC assumed the receivership of 
IASA After Gaubert's administrative claim was denied six 
months later, he filed the instant FTCA suit in United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking 
$100 million m damages for the alleged negligence of federal 
officials in selecting the new officers and directors and in par-
ticipating in the day-to-day management of IASA The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the United 
States, finding that all of the challenged actions of the regula-
tors fell within the discretionary function exception to the 
FTCA, found m 28 U. S C. § 2680(a)6 
'Gauben was required b\ statute to seek relief from the agencies prior 
to ftkng an FTCA suit See 2S U S C § 2675 
•Citing 12 U S C 5 1464, the court determined that the FHLBB had 
broad discretionary authont} to regulate the savings and loan industn 
Although acknowledging that most of Gaubert's allegations involved the 
regulators' activity prior to the date of receivership, the court stressed 
that had the regulators invoked their statutory authority to place IASA in 
receivership earlier, all of the challenged actions would have fallen within 
the exception The court also pointed out that had IASA and Gaubert 
failed to cooperate with the regulators receivership likely would ha\e fol-
59 L^ 424(i The I mted Stales LA^ R ^ EEK 3-26-91 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part 
and reversed in part 885 F. 2d 1284 (1989) Relying on 
this Court's decision in Indian Towing Co v United States, 
350 U. S 61 (1955), the court distinguished between "policy 
decisions," which fall within the exception, and "operational 
actions," which do not 885 F 2d, at 1287 After claiming 
further support for this distinction in this Court's decisions in 
United States v S A Empresa de Vvacao Aerea Rio Gran-
dense (Varxg Airlines), 467 U. S 797 (1984), and Berkomtz 
v United States, 486 U S 531 (1988), the court explained 
"The authority of the FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas to take 
the actions that were taken in this case, although not 
guided by regulations, is unchallenged The FHLBB 
and FHLB-Dallas officials did not have regulations tell-
ing them, at every turn, how to accomplish their goals 
for IASA, this fact, however, does not automatically 
render their decisions discretionary and immune from 
FTCA suits Only policy oriented decisions enjoy such 
immunity Thus, the FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas offi-
cials were only protected by the discretionary function 
exception until their actions became operational in na-
ture and thus crossed the line established m Indian 
Towing " 885 F 2d, at 1289 (citations and footnote 
omitted) 
In the court's view, that line was crossed when the regula-
tors "began to advise IASA management and participate in 
management decisions " Id , at 1290 Consequently, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of 
the claims which concerned the merger, neutralization agree-
ment, personal guarantee, and replacement of IASA manage-
ment, but reversed the dismissal of the claims which con-
cerned the regulators' activities after they assumed a 
supervisory role in IASA's day-to-day affairs We granted 
certiorari, 496 U S (1990), and now reverse 
II 
The liability of the United States under the FTCA is sub-
ject to the various exceptions contained in §2680, including 
the "discretionary function" exception at issue here That 
exception provides that the Government is not liable for 
"[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the Government, exercising due care, in the 
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such 
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise 
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Go\ernment, whether or 
not the discretion involved be abused " 28 U S C 
§ 2680(a) 
The exception covers only acts that are discretionary in na-
ture, acts that "mvolv[e] an element of judgment or choice," 
Berkomtz, supra, at 536, see also Dalehte v United States 
346 U S 15, 34 (1953), and "it is the nature of the conduct, 
rather than the status of the actor," that governs whether 
the exception applies Vang Airlines, supra, at 813 The 
requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a "fed-
eral statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a 
lowed sooner In the District Court s view, "[t]he fact that [Gaubert] co-
operated when he could have refused will not give [him] a cause of action 
where he otherwise would have none " App to Pet for Cert 24a-25a 
Moreover because the decision to place IASA in receivership involv ed the 
exercise of discretion the decision iwt to do so at an earlier date was neces-
sarih discretionary as well The court viewed the decision to supervise 
IASA s activities first bv informal means as an extension of the discretion-
al-) decision to postpone receivership 
course of action for an employee to follow," because "the em-
ployee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive " 
Berkomtz, 486 U S , at 536 
Furthermore, even "assuming the challenged conduct in-
volves an element of judgment," it remains to be decided 
"whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary 
function exception was designed to shield " Ibid See 
Varip Airlines, 467 U S , at 813 Because the purpose of 
the exception is to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of leg-
islative and administrative decisions grounded in social, eco-
nomic, and political policy through the medium of an action in 
tort," id , at 814, when properly construed, the exception 
"protects only governmental actions and decisions based on 
considerations of public policy " Berkomtz, supra, at 537 
Where Congress has delegated the authority to an inde-
pendent agency or to the executive branch to implement the 
general provisions of a regulatory* statute and to issue regula-
tions to that end, there is no doubt that planning-level deci-
sions establishing programs are protected by the discretion-
ary' function exception, as is the promulgation of regulations 
by which the agencies are to carry out the programs In ad-
dition, the actions of Government agents involving the neces-
sary element of choice and grounded in the social, economic, 
or political goals of the statute and regulations are protected 
Thus, in Dalehite, the exception barred recovery for claims 
arising from a massive fertilizer explosion The fertilizer 
had been manufactured, packaged, and prepared for export 
pursuant to detailed regulations as part of a comprehensive 
federal program aimed at increasing the food supply in occu-
pied areas after World War II 346 U S , at 19-21 Not 
only was the cabinet-level decision to institute the fertilizer 
program discretionary, but so were the decisions concerning 
the specific requirements for manufacturing the fertilizer 
Id , at 37-38 Nearly 30 years later, in Vang Airlines, the 
Federal Aviation Administration's actions m formulating and 
implementing a "spot-check" plan for airplane inspection 
were protected by the discretionary function exception be-
cause of the agency's authority to establish safety standards 
for airplanes 467 U S , at 815 Actions taken in further-
ance of the program were likewise protected, even if those 
particular actions were negligent Id , at 820 Most re-
cently, in Berkomtz, we examined a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme governing the licensing of laboratories to 
produce polio vaccine and the release to the public of particu-
lar drugs 486 U S . at 533 We found that some of the 
claims fell outside the exception, because the agency employ-
ees had failed to follow the specific directions contained in the 
applicable regulations, i e , in those instances, there was no 
room for choice or judgment Id , at 542-543 We then re-
manded the case for an analysis of the remaining claims in 
light of the applicable regulations Id , at 544 
Under the applicable precedents, therefore, if a regulation 
mandates particular conduct, and the employee obeys the di-
rection, the Government will be protected because the action 
will be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to the 
promulgation of the regulation See Dalehite, supra, at 36 
If the employee violates the mandator} regulation, there will 
be no shelter from liability because there is no room for 
choice and the action will be contrary to policy On the other 
hand, if a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very 
existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that 
a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves con-
sideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation 
of the regulations 
Not all agencies issue comprehensive regulations, how-
ever Some establish policy on a case-by-case basis, 
whether through adjudicatory proceedings or through admin-
istration of agency programs Others promulgate regula-
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tions on some topics, but not on others In addition, an 
agency may rely on internal guidelines rather than on pub-
lished regulations In any event, it will most often be true 
that the general aims and policies of the controlling statute 
will be evident from its text 
When established governmental policy, as expressed or im-
plied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a 
Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be pre-
sumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when ex-
ercising that discretion For a complaint to survive a motion 
to dismiss, it must allege facts which would support a finding 
that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that 
can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory re-
gime The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjec-
tive intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute 
or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on 
whether they are susceptible to policy analysis 7 
III 
In light of our cases and their interpretation of § 2680(a), it 
is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
exception does not reach decisions made at the operational or 
management level of the bank involved m this case A dis-
cretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment, there 
is nothing in that description that refers exclusively to policy-
making or planning functions Day-to-day management of 
banking affairs, like the management of other businesses, 
regularly require judgment as to which of a range of permis-
sible courses is the wisest Discretionary conduct is not con-
fined to the policy or planning level "[I]t is the nature of 
the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs 
whether the discretionary function exception applies in a 
given case " Vang Airlines, supra, at 813 
In Vang Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration 
had devised a system of "spot checking" airplanes We held 
that not onl> was this act discretionary but so too w ere the 
acts of agenc\ employees in executing the program since the) 
had a range of discretion to exercise in deciding how to carr> 
out the spot-check activity 467 U S , at 820 Likewise in 
Berkowtz, supra, although holding that some acts on the op-
erational level were not discretionary and therefore were 
without the exception, ue recognized that other acts, if held 
to be discretionary on remand would be protected 486 
U S , at 545 
The Court's first use of the term "operational" in connec-
tion with the discretionary function exception occurred in 
Dalehite, where the Court noted that "[t]he decisions held 
culpable w ere all responsibly made at a planning rather than 
operational level and involved considerations more or less im-
portant to the practicability of the Government's fertilizer 
program " 346 U S , at 42 Gaubert relies upon this state-
ment as support for his argument that the Court of Appeals 
applied the appropriate analysis to the allegations of the 
Amended Complaint, but the distinction in Dalehite was 
merely description of the level at which the challenged con-
duct occurred There was no suggestion that decisions made 
at an operational level could not also be based on polic) 
'There are obviously discretionary acts performed b\ a Government 
agent that are within the scope of his employment but not within the dis-
cretionary function exception because these acts cannot be said to be based 
on the purposes that the regulator} regime seeks to accomplish If one of 
the officials involved in this case drove an automobile on a mission con 
nected with his official duties and negligently colbded with another car the 
exception would not apph Although driving requires the constant exer-
cise of discretion the official s decisions in exercising that discretion can 
hardh be said to be grounded in regulator) policy 
Neither is the decision below supported by Indian Towing 
There the Coast Guard had negligently failed to maintain a 
lighthouse by allowing the light to go out The United 
States was held liable, not because the negbgence occurred at 
the operational level but because making sure the light was 
operational "did not involve any permissible exercise of policy 
judgment " Berkovitz, supra, at 538, n 3 Indeed, the 
Government did not even claim the benefit of the exception 
but unsuccessfully urged that maintaining the light was a 
governmental function for which it could not be liable The 
Court of Appeals misinterpreted Berkovitz1 s reference to In-
dian Towing as perpetuating a nonexistent dichotomy be-
tween discretionary functions and operational activities 
885 F 2d, at 1289 Consequently, once the court deter-
mined that some of the actions challenged by Gaubert oc-
curred at an operational level, it concluded, incorrectly, that 
those actions must necessarily have been outside the scope of 
the discretionary function exception 
IV 
We now inquire whether the Court of Appeals was correct 
in holding that some of the acts alleged in Gaubert's 
Amended Complaint were not discretionary acts within the 
meaning of § 2680(a) The decision we review was entered 
on a motion to dismiss We therefore "accept all of the fac-
tual allegations in [Gaubert's] complaint as true" and ask 
whether the allegations state a claim sufficient to sur\i\e a 
motion to dismiss Berkontz, supra, at 540 
The Court of Appeals dismissed several of the allegations 
in the Amended Complaint on the ground that the challenged 
activities fell within the discretionary function exception 
These allegations concerned t4the decision to merge IASA 
with Investex and seek a neutralization agreement from 
Gaubert," as well as "the decision to replace the IASA Board 
of Directors with FHLBB approved persons and the actions 
taken to effectuate that decision " 885 F 2d, at 1290 
Gaubert has not challenged this aspect of the court's ruling 
Consequently, we review onl> those allegations in the 
Amended Complaint which the Court of Appeals view ed as 
surviving the Government's motion to dismiss 
These claims asserted that the regulators had achie\ ed * a 
constant federal presence" at IASA App 14 c 33 In de-
scribing this presence, the Amended Complaint alleged that 
the regulators "consulted] as to da> -to-da\ affairs and opera-
tions of IASA," id , at 14, c33a, "participated in management 
decisions" at IASA board meetings, id , at 14, r33b. "became 
involved in giving advice, making recommendations, urging, 
or directing action or procedures at IASA," id , at 14 r33c 
and "advised their hand-picked directors and officers on a % a-
net} of subjects", id , at 14, T34 Specifically, the com-
plaint enumerated seven instances or kinds of objectionable 
official involvement First, the regulators "arranged for the 
hiring for IASA of consultants on operational and finan-
cial matters and asset management " Id , at 14, c34a Sec-
ond, the officials "urged or directed that IASA convert fiom 
a state-chartered savings and loan to a federally-chartered 
savings and loan in part so that it could become the exclusn e 
government entity with power to control IASA " Id , at 14, 
c34b Third, the regulators "gave ad\ice and made recom-
mendations concerning whether, when, and how to place 
IASA subsidiaries into bankruptcy " Id , at 15, r34c 
Fourth, the officials "mediated salary disputes between 
IASA and its senior officers " Id , at 15, c34d Fifth, the 
regulators "reviewed a draft complaint in litigation" that 
IASA s board contemplated filing and were "so actneh in-
volved in giving advice, making recommendations, and di-
recting matters related to IASA's litigation policy that the\ 
»J f f ine i nuea wares i.w ^ kkK 3-25-91 
were able successfully to stall the Board of Directors' ulti-
mate decision to file the complaint until the Bank Board in 
Washington had reviewed, advised on, and commented on 
the draft." Id , at 15, H34e (emphasis in original) Sixth, 
the regulators "actively intervened with the Texas Savings 
and Loan Department (IASA's principal regulator) when the 
State attempted to install a supervisory agent at IASA " 
Id , at 15, c34f Finally, the FHLB-D president wrote the 
IASA board of directors "affirming that his agency had 
placed that Board of Directors into office, and describing 
their mutual goal to protect the FSLIC insurance fund " 
Id , at 15-16, T34g. According to Gaubert, the losses he suf-
fered were caused by the regulators' "assumption of the duty 
to participate in, and to make, the day-to-day decisions at 
IASA and [the] negligent discharge of that assumed duty " 
Id , at 17, f 39. Moreover, he alleged that "[t]he involve-
ment of the FHLB-Dallas in the affairs of IASA went beyond 
its normal regulatory- activity, and the agency actually substi-
tuted its decisions for those of the directors and officers of the 
association " Id , at 19, f 55 
We first inquire whether the challenged actions were dis-
cretionary, or whether the) were instead controlled by man-
dator} statutes or regulations Berkomtz, 486 U S . at 536 
Although the FHLBB, which oversaw the other agencies at 
issue, had promulgated extensive regulations which were 
then in effect, see 12 CFR §§500-591 (1986). neither part} 
has identified formal regulations governing the conduct in 
question As already noted, 12 U S C § 1464(a) authorizes 
the FHLBB to examine and regulate FSLA's, "giving pri-
mary consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions 
in the United States " Both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals recognized that the agencies possessed 
broad statutory authority to supervise financial institutions " 
The relevant statutory provisions were not mandatory, but 
left to the judgment of the agency the decision of when to in-
stitute proceedings against a financial institution and which 
mechanism to use For example, the FSLIC had authont} 
to terminate an institution's insured status, issue cease-and-
desist orders, and suspend or remove an institution's officers, 
if "in the opinion of the Corporation" such action was war-
ranted because the institution or its officers were engaging in 
an "unsafe or unsound practice" in connection with the busi-
ness of the institution 12 U S C §§173CKDM), (e)d). 
(g)(1) The FHLBB had parallel authority to issue cease-
and-desist orders and suspend or remove an institution's offi-
cers §§ 1464(2)(A), (4)(a) Although the statute enumer-
ated specific grounds warranting an appointment b} the 
FHLBB of a conservator or receiver, the determination of 
whether any of these grounds existed depended upon "the 
opinion of the Board " § 1464(6)(A) The agencies here 
were not bound to act in a particular wa), the exercise of 
their authont} involved a great "element of judgment or 
choice " Berkoatz, supra, at 536 
We a^e unconvinced by Gaubert's assertion that because 
the agencies did not institute formal proceedings against 
IASA. the} had no discretion to take informal actions as the} 
did Although the statutes provided only for formal pro-
ceedings there is nothing in the language or structure of the 
statutes that prevented the regulators from invoking less for-
mal means of supervision of financial institutions Not onlv 
was there no statutor} or regulator} mandate which com-
pelled the regulators to act in a particular way, but there was 
no prohibition against the use of supervisor} mechanisms not 
specifically set forth in statute or regulation 
'As explained aoo\e the agencies a* issue here have since been abol-
ished although the> have been replaced b\ agencies possessing similar dis-
cretionary authorr\ See n 1 supra 
This is the view of the FHLBB, for in a resolution passed 
in 1982, the FHLBB adopted "a formal statement of policy 
regarding the Bank Board's use of supervisory actions," 
which provided in pa^t: 
"In carrying out its supervisor}' responsibilities with 
respect to thrift institutions insured by the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (TSLIC) , . . . it is 
the policy of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that 
violations of law or regulation, and unsafe or unsound 
practices will not be tolerated and will result in the initi-
ation of strong supervisory and/or enforcement action by 
the Board It is the Bank Board's goal to minimize, and 
where possible, to prevent losses occasioned by viola-
tions or unsafe and unsound practices by taking prompt 
and effective supervisory' action. . . . 
"The Board recognizes that supervisory actions must 
be tailored to each case, and that such actions will van-
according to the severity of the violation of law or regu-
lation or the unsafe or unsound practice, as well as to the 
responsiveness and willingness of the association to take 
corrective action The following guidance should be 
considered for all supervisory actions 
"In each case, based upon an assessment of manage-
ment's willingness to take appropriate corrective action 
and the potential harm to the institution if corrective 
action is not effected, the staff must weigh the appro-
priateness of available supervisory actions If the po-
tential harm is slight and there is a substantial prob-
ability that management will correct the situation, 
informal supervisor}* guidance and oversight is appropri-
ate If some potential harm to the institution or its 
customers is likely, a supervisory agreement should be 
promptly negotiated and implemented If substantial 
financial harm may occur to the institution, its custom-
ers, or the FSLIC and there is substantial doubt that 
corrections will be made promptly, a cease-and-desist 
order should be sought immediately through the Office 
of General Counsel " FHLBB Resolution No 82-381 
(Ma} 26, 1982), reprinted in Brief for Respondent 4a-6a 
From this statement it is clear that the regulators had the 
discretion to supervise IASA through informal means, rather 
than invoke statutor}' sanctions 9 
Gaubert also argues that the challenged actions fall outside 
the discretionary function exception because they involved 
the mere application of technical skills and business expei-
tise Brief for Respondent 33 But this is just another wa} 
of saying that the considerations involving the da}-to-dav 
management of a business concern such as IASA are so pre-
cisely formulated that decisions at the operational lev el never 
involve the exercise of discretion within the meaning of 
§ 2680(a), a notion that we have already rejected in disap-
proving the rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision It 
may be that certain decisions resting on mathematical cal-
culations, for example, involve no choice or judgment in car-
rying out the calculations, but the regulator}* acts alleged 
here are not of that genre Rather, it is plain to us that each 
of the challenged actions involved the exercise of choice and 
judgment 
We are also convinced that each of the regulatory actions m 
question involved the kind of policy judgment that the dis-
cretionary function exception was designed to shield The 
•We not* that in a recent opinion b> Judge Garza who also wrote the 
opinion at issue here the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to 
extend its decision in Gaubert to impose habilit\ on the FDIC for failure *o 
institute statuton receivership proceedings against a thrift See Fedeiv! 
Deposit hmiravct Corp \ Mmahat 907 F 2d 546 552 (CAS 1990) 
FHLBB Resolution quoted above, coupled with the relevant 
statutory provisions, established governmental policy which 
is presumed to have been furthered when the regulators ex-
ercised their discretion to choose from various courses of ac-
tion in supervising IASA Although Gaubert contends that 
day-to-day decisions concerning IASA's affairs did not impli-
cate social, economic, or political policies, even the Court of 
Appeals recognized that these day-to-day "operational" deci-
sions were undertaken for policy reasons of primary concern 
to the regulator}' agencies 
a[T]he federal regulators here had two discrete purposes 
in mind as they commenced dav-to-day operations at 
IASA First, they sought to protect the solvency of the 
savings and loan industry at large, and maintain the pub-
lic's confidence in that industry Second, they sought to 
preserve the assets of IASA for the benefit of depositors 
and shareholders, of which Gaubert was one " 885 F 
2d, at 1290 
Consequently, Gaubert's assertion that the day-to-day in-
volvement of the regulators with IASA is actionable because 
it went beyond "normal regulator} activity" is insupportable 
We find nothing in Gaubert's Amended Complaint effec-
tively alleging that the discretionary acts performed bv, the 
regulators were not entitled to the exemption By Gaubert's 
own admission, the regulators replaced IASA's management 
in order to protect the FSLIC's insurance fund, thus it cannot 
be disputed that thus action was based on public policy consid-
erations The regulators actions in urging IASA to convert 
to federal charter and in intervening with the state agencv 
were directl) related to public pohc} considerations regard-
ing federal o\ ersight of the thrift industry So w ere advis-
ing the hiring of a financial consultant, advising when to place 
IASA subsidiaries into bankruptcy, intervening on IASA's 
behalf with Texas officials, advising on litigation policy, and 
mediating salar} disputes There are no allegations that the 
regulators ga\ e anything other than the kind of advice that 
was within the purview of the policies behind the statutes 
There is no doubt that in advising IASA the regulators 
used the power of persuasion to accomplish their goals 
Nevertheless, we long ago recognized that regulators have 
the authority to use such tactics in supervising financial 
institutions In United States v Philadelphia Xatwna! 
Bank, 374 U S 321 (1963), the Court considered the wide 
array of supervisor} tools available to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve Svstem in 
overseeing banks Noting the "frequent and intensive" na-
ture of bank examinations and the "detailed periodic reports" 
banks were required to submit, the Court found that "the 
agencies maintain virtually a day-to-dav, surveillance of the 
American banking system " Id , at 329 Moreover, the 
agencies ability to terminate a bank's insured sta'u^ and m-
voke other less drastic sanctions meant that "recommenda-
tions bv. the agencies concerning banking practices tend to be 
followed bv, bankers without the necessity of formal compli-
ance proceedings " Id , at 330 These statements applv 
with equal force to supervision by federal agencies of the sav-
ings and loan industry More than 30 vears ago. the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made similar observations in a 
case involving allegations that the FHLBB had improperly 
pressured a savings and loan < directors to resign See 
Miami Beach Federal Sauna* & Loan Association v 
Callander, 256 F 2d 410 (CA5 195S) The court noted that 
"[w]hen a governmental agencv holds such great power* ovei 
its offspring, even to the point of appointing a conservator oi 
receiver to replace the management . it i* difficult to hold 
that an informal request, even demand, to clean hou>e would 
amount to an aDuse of the <natutorv powers and discretion of 
the agency " Id , at 414-415 Consequently, neither the 
pervasiveness of the regulators' presence at IASA nor the 
forcefulness of their recommendations is sufficient to alter 
the supervisor}' nature of the regulators' actions 
In the end, Gaubert's Amended Complaint alleges nothing 
more than negligence on the part of the regulators Indeed, 
the two substantive counts seek relief for "negligent selection 
of directors and officers" and "negligent involvement in day-
to-day operations " App 17, 18 Gaubert asserts that the 
discretionary function exception protects only those acts of 
negligence which occur in the course of establishing broad 
policies, rather than individual acts of negligence which occur 
in the course of day-to-da> activities Brief for Respondent 
39 But we have already disposed of that submission See 
supra, at 9 If the routine or frequent nature of a decision 
were sufficient to remove an otherwise discretionary act from 
the scope of the exception, then countless policy-based deci-
sions b> regulators exercising day-to-day supervisory au-
thority would be actionable This is not the rule of our 
cases 
I V 
Because from the face of the Amended Complaint, it is ap-
parent that all of the challenged actions of the federal regu-
lators involved the exercise of discretion in furtherance of 
public policv goals, the Court of Appeals erred m failing to 
find the claims barred by the discretionary function exception 
of the Federal Tort Claims Act We therefore reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion 
It is so ordered 
JUSTICE SCALIA. concurring 
I concur m the judgment and in much of the opinion of the 
Court I wTite separately because I do not think it neces-
sary to analyze individually each of the particular action-
challenged by Gaubert. nor do I think an individualized anal-
ysis necessarily leads to the results the Court obtains 
I 
The so-called discretionarv function exception to the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA) doe^ not protect all govern-
mental activities involving an element of choice Berkox dz 
v Unded States, 486 U S 531, 536-537 (19SS) The choice 
must be "grounded in social, economic, [or] political policv,' 
United States v Yang Airlines, 467 U S 797 814 (19^4\ 
or. more briefly, nlust represent a "policv judgment," Bcr-
kovitz, 486 U S , fett 537 Unfortunatelv, lower courts have 
had difficult} in applying this test 
The Court of Appeals in this case concluded thar a choice 
involves policv judgment (in the relevant sense) if it is maar 
at a planning rather than an operational level within the 
agenc> 885 F £d 1284, 1287 (19S9) I agree with the 
Court that this is wrong I think, howevei. that the level a: 
which the decision is made is often relevant to the discretion 
an, function inquiry, since the answer to that mquirv turn-
on both the subject matter and the office of the deciMon 
maker In mv view a choice is shielded from habihtv bv the 
discretional*} function exception if the choice is. under the 
particular circumstances, one that ought to be informed bv 
considerations of social, economic, or political policv and is 
made bv, an officer whose official responsibilities include as-
sessment of tho^e consideration^ 
This test, bv looking not onl> to the deacon but also to the 
officer who made it, recognizes that there is something to the 
planning vs. operational dichotomy—though the "something" 
is not precisely what the Court of Appeals believed Ordi-
narily, an employee working at the operational level is not 
responsible for policy decisions, even though policy consider-
ations may be highly relevant to his actions The dock fore-
man's decision to store bags of fertilizer in a highly compact 
fashion is not protected by this exception because, even if he 
carefully calculated considerations of cost to the government 
versus safety, it was not his responsibility to ponder such 
things, the Secretary of Agriculture's decision to the same 
effect is protected, because weighing those considerations is 
his task Cf Dalehite v United States, 346 U. S 15 (1953) 
In Indian Tomng Co v. United States, 350 U S 61 (1956), 
the United States was held liable for, among other things, 
the failure of Coast Guard maintenance personnel adequately 
to inspect electrical equipment in a lighthouse, though there 
could conceivably be policy reasons for conducting onlj su-
perficial inspections, the decisions had been made by the 
maintenance personnel, and it was assuredly not their 
responsibiht} to ponder such things This same factor ex-
plains wh} it is universall} acknowledged that the discretion-
ary function exception never protects against liability for the 
negligence of a vehicle driver See ante, at S, n 7 The 
need for expedition vs the need for safety may well repre-
sent a policy choice, cf Dalehite, supra, but the government 
does not expect its drivers to make that choice on a case-b}-
case basis 
Moreover, not only is it necessary for application of the dis-
cretionary function exception that the decisionmaker be an 
official who possesses the relevant polic} responsibility, but 
also the decisionmaker's close identification with policymak-
ing can be strong evidence that the other half of the test is 
met —z e , that the subject-matter of the decision is one that 
ought to be informed b} polic} considerations I am much 
more inclined to believe, for example, that the manner of 
storing fertilizer raises economic polic} concerns if the deci-
sion on that subject has been reserved to the Secretary of 
Agriculture himself That it is proper to take the level of the 
decisionmaker into account is supported bv, the phrase of the 
FTCA immediately preceding the discretional-} function ex-
ception, which excludes governmental liability for acts taken, 
"exercising due care, in the execution of a regulation, 
whether or not such regulation be valid " We have 
taken this to mean that regulations "[can] not be attacked 
bv, claimants under the Act " Dalehite, 346 U S , at 42 
This immunity represents an absolute statutory presump-
tion, so to speak, that all regulations involve polic} judg-
ments that must not be interfered with I think there is a 
similar presumption, though not an absolute one, that deci-
sions reserved to policv,-making levels involve such judg-
ments—and the higher the policy-making level, the stronger 
the piesumption 
II 
Turning to the facts of the present case, I find it difficult to 
sa> that the particular activities of which Gaubert complains 
are necessarily discretionary functions, so that a motion to 
dismiss could properl} be granted on that ground To take 
but one example, Gaubert alleges that the regulators acted 
negligently m selecting consultants to advise the bank The 
Coun argues that such a decision, even though taken in the 
course of "da}-to-day" management, surelv, involves an ele-
ment of choice But that answers onl\ the first half of the 
Berkovitz mquirv. It remains to be determined w hether the 
choice is of a policymaking nature Pei haps one can imagine 
a relative}} high- level government official, authorized gener-
alh to manage the bank in such fashion as to further appli-
cable government policies, who hires consultants and other 
employees with those policy objectives in mind. The dis-
cretionary function exception arguably mould protect such a 
hiring choice But one may also imagine a federal officer of 
relatively low level, authorized to hire a bank consultant by 
applying ordinary standards of business judgment, and not 
authorized to consider matters of government policy in the 
process That hiring decision would not be protected by the 
discretionary function exception, even though some element 
of choice is involved 
I do not think it advances the argument to observe, ante, 
at 16, that "[t]here are no allegations that the regulators gave 
anything other than the kind of advice that was within the 
purview of the policies behind the statutes " An official ma} 
act "within the purview" of the relevant policy without him-
self making policy decisions—in wThich case, if the action is 
negligent (and was not specifically mandated by the relevant 
policy, see Dalehite, 346 U S at 36), the discretionary func-
tion exception does not bar United States Lability Con-
trariwise, action "outside the purview" of the relevant polic} 
does not necessarily fail to qualify for the discretionary func-
tion defense If the action involves policy discretion, and the 
officer is authorized to exercise that discretion, the defense 
applies even if the discretion has been exercised erroneously, 
so as to frustrate the relevant policy See 28 U S C 
§ 2680(a) (discretionary function exception applies "whether 
or not the discretion involved be abused ") In other w^ords, 
action "within the purview" of the relevant policy is neither a 
necessar} nor a sufficient condition for invoking the dis-
cretional-}' function exception 
The present case comes to us on a motion to dismiss 
Lacking any sort of factual record, we can do little more than 
speculate as to whether the officers here exercised polic}-
makmg responsibility with respect to the individual acts in 
question Without more, the motion would have to be de-
nied I think, however, that the Court's conclusion to the 
contrar} is properly reached under a slightly different ap-
proach The alleged misdeeds complained of here w ere not 
actuall} committed by federal officers Rather, federal offi-
cers "recommended" that such actions be taken, making it 
clear that if the recommendations were not followed the bank 
would be seized and operated directly b} the regulators In 
effect, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) im-
posed the advice which Gaubert challenges as a condition of 
allowing the bank to remain independent But surel} the 
decision w hether or not to take over a bank is a polic} -based 
decision to which habihtv ma} not attach —a decision that 
ought to be influenced b} considerations of "social, economic, 
[or] political polic}," Vang Airhnes 467 U S , at 814. and 
that in the nature of things can onl} be made b} FHLBB offi-
cers responsible for w eighmg such considerations I think a 
corollary is that setting the conditions under which the 
FHLBB will or will not take over a bank is an exercise of 
policymaking discretion B} establishing such a list of condi-
tions, as was done here, the Board in effect announces guide-
lines pursuant to which it will exercise its discretional*} func-
tion of taking over the bank Establishing guidelines for the 
exercise of a discretionary function is unquestionabh a dis-
cretionary function Thus, without resort to item-b}-item 
analysis, I would find each of Gaubert's challenges barred b} 
the discretionary function exception 
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(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in 
Subsection 63-30-36 (3)(c). 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental 
entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of 
is one for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee 
may be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee 
acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
Section 2. Section 63-30-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter 139, Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read: 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other 
structures. 
[immani-ty] Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct^ or other structure 
located [thereon] on them. 
Section 3. Section 63-30-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter 139, Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read: 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or defective 
public building, structure, or other public improvement — Exception, 
-3-
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[fmnmnity] Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from a 
dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, 
reservoir^ or other public improvement, [immunity—is—not—waived—for 
iatent-defeetive-conditions-] 
Section 4. Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by Chapters 15 and 319, Laws of Utah 1990, is amended to read: 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or 
omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or .the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not tfhe discretion is 
abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, 
or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by ^ the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
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(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection [of-any-property]; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by [the] an employee whether or not it is 
negligent or intentional; 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public 
demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbance^; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or 
city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on [state—tands] publicly owned or 
controlled lands, any condition existing in connection with an abandoned 
mine or mining operation, or [as-the-resafct-of] any activity authorized 
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog; [or] 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural 
di sasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm 
systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
-5-
S. B. No. 218 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, 
bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; | 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; or 
[{±3}] (18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 
Section 5. Section 63-30-10.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 
by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987, is amended to read: 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private property without 
compensation. 
(1) [frnmanity] As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the 
governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses 
without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the 
requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78, Eminent Domain. 
Section 6. Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987, is amended to read: 
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